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Abstract 
The effects of capital controls on international trade have not been thoroughly examined 
empirically. Using highly disaggregated bilateral industry-level export data across a large number 
of countries, this paper evaluates how restrictions on cross-border capital flows affect export. We 
identify the effect of capital control on export by exploiting the variation in capital control across 
countries and variation in external finance dependence across industries. While we find that capital 
control adversely effects total exports, analyses of the export margins indicate that the export 
distorting effect of capital controls works by deterring single and multiple export market entries by 
exporters, reducing export intensities of exporters, and the range of goods exporters can ship to 
each market destination. Our result has important policy implications for countries that seek to 
pursue export-led growth but suffer from capital accounts restrictions. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we analyze the international trade effects of fettered international capital flows and 
the mechanisms through which this works. The potential economic effects of restrictions on cross-
border capital flows have been an issue of a long, unending debate among economists and 
policymakers. While the debate was lost between the late 1990s and early 2000s, the global 
financial crisis in 2008/2009 has invigorated it. However, this time, the debate had favored capital 
control as a seeming feat was attained by its exponents when in November of 2012, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) endorsed a limited use of capital control (IMF, 2012).  
 
This new stance of IMF, which differs from its age-long neoliberal stance, has intensified research 
examining the potential costs, benefits, and effectiveness of capital control. However, extant 
studies have focused mainly on economic growth (Edison et al., 2004; Henry, 2007), while few 
studies focus on different growth components such as domestic investment (Mody & Murshid, 
2005), financial development (Klein & Olivei, 2008), exchange rate (Edwards & Rigobon, 
2009), and productivity (Bonfiglioli, 2008), among others. Less studied in this literature is the 
relationship between capital control and international trade, although capital control can affect 
international trade in several ways such as impacting the domestic price of imports, transaction 
costs, exchange rates, financial market, and portfolio investment (Tamirisa, 1999). 
 
To our knowledge, studies that have examined the trade effects of capital control are Tamirisa 
(1999), Wei & Zhang (2007), and Fu & Cao (2020). Tamirisa (1999) utilized a cross-sectional 
sample of 40 countries and found that exchange and capital controls reduce trade. However, a 
further analysis comprising different samples of developed and developing countries in the study, 
showed that the effect was only evident in non-industrialized countries. Wei & Zhang (2007) 
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examined whether exchange control works as a form of non-tariff barriers to trade. They found that 
a one standard deviation increase in the controls on trade payment has the same negative effect on 
trade as an increase in tariff by about 14 percentage point, while a one standard deviation increase 
in the controls on foreign exchange transactions reduces trade by the same amount as a rise in tariff 
by 11 percentage point. Finally, Fu & Cao (2020) examined the trade effects of inward and outward 
capital controls. They found that inward capital controls hurt exports, while outward capital 
controls promote exports. 
 
While the previous studies have helped us gain insights into the relationship between capital control 
and international trade, the question about how capital controls affect international trade has not 
been addressed. Arguing along this line, Tamirisa (1999) noted that the effect of capital control on 
trade would depend, among others, on their interaction with other distortions in the economy. 
However, their study did not attempt to identify or analyze how these distortions influence the trade 
effects of capital control. Hence, we contribute to the literature by examining how capital control 
can affect international trade by increasing the cost of external capital. We also contribute to the 
literature by examining how capital controls affect the different trade margins to provide further 
context on the exact mechanism linking capital controls and trade. 
 
Our argument of a potential trade effect of capital control via the “cost of external capital channel” 
is based on the well-established literature suggesting the importance of a firm’s access to credit for 
international trade (Amiti & Weinstein, 2011; Manova, 2013). Compared to domestic production, 
international trade is associated with additional upfront fixed costs and huge variable costs, which 
make firms participating in international trade to depend more on external finance (Manova, 2013). 
To meet these enormous finance needs, firms access both domestic and foreign markets. However, 
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because capital control limits the credit supply options for firms, this will reduce the amount of 
available capital and increase the cost of capital, as domestic interest rates become sticky relative 
to the world's competitive market price. Hence, firms are either forced to lower investments and 
trim production or shut down entirely. Either of these would have a dampening effect on trade. 
Importantly, the limited available capital and the high cost of external capital would constrain firms 
in meeting up the enormous fixed and variable costs associated with international trade, and thereby 
exert a negative effect on both the extensive and intensive export margins. 
 
To evaluate our idea that capital control affects trade through raising the cost of external capital, 
we examine the differential impact of capital control on the export activities across industries with 
inherently different reliance on external finance (following the methodology in Rajan & Zingales, 
1998). As stressed by Braun & Larrain (2005), the response of firms to credit market frictions 
depends on their relative reliance on the financial market. Hence, as capital control curtails the 
amount of available capital and raises the cost of external capital in the financial market, it should 
have a disproportionately contractionary impact on sectors that are more dependent on external 
finance. Consequently, we answer our research question by evaluating whether countries with 
fettered international capital flows have, on average, relatively worse export performance in 
industries with greater reliance on external finance. We test this hypothesis using a bilateral export 
data of 99 countries in 27 industries over the period spanning 1995-2015. We utilized the Fernández 
et al. (2016) capital control indicator as an empirical measure of the extent of restrictions on cross-
border capital flows in a country. External finance dependence is measured using the industry 
external finance dependence initially computed by Rajan & Zingales (1998). The index measures 
for each industry, the share of capital expenditures not financed with cash flows from operations. 
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Because firms depend on external finance to fund their activities, including trade, they are more 
susceptible to credit friction in the financial market. 
 
To summarize our results, we find that fettered international capital flows, by increasing the cost 
of external capital, distorts a country's export performance. This result holds after controlling for a 
battery of fixed effects at the country and industry levels, and after employing alternative 
estimation strategies including the Helpman et al. (2008) two-stage estimation procedure and 
Santos & Tenreyro (2006) Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood to address zero trade 
observations. The result also remains robust after controlling for conventional sources of 
comparative advantage and the quality of the domestic credit market. It is also robust to using 
alternative measures of capital control. When we differentiate between inward and outward capital 
controls, we find that both types of restrictions distort exports, albeit the relative impact of inward 
capital control is much higher. Decomposing exports into the extensive and intensive margins to 
further underpin how capital control affects exports, we find that capital control adversely affects 
the export performances of a country, by deterring single and multiple export market entries and 
reducing the range of goods exported (i.e., extensive margin); and by reducing export intensities 
(i.e., intensive margin), particularly in industries that rely more on external finance. Finally, we 
find that the export distorting effects of capital control is higher in non-OECD countries relative to 
OECD countries. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical background 
that informs the empirical analysis. Section 3 discusses the research methodology, specifying the 
empirical model and different data sources used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results, while Section 5 concludes.  
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2. Theoretical Background 
The conventional view about capital account liberalization is that unfettered international capital 
flows can foster a more efficient allocation of resources, provide opportunities for risk 
diversification and credit access at the most favorable rates, promote intertemporal trade and help 
promote financial development and ultimately, lead to a permanent increase in the standard of 
living (Edison et al., 2004; Henry, 2007). Hence, imposing restrictions on capital mobility means 
foregoing these benefits, owing to the distortions and resource misallocation that capital control 
gives rise to (Ostry et al., 2010). It is further argued that the gains of unfettered international capital 
flows would be higher in developing countries because they are relatively capital scarce and labor 
abundant, so access to foreign capital should help them increase investment and grow faster (Kose 
et al., 2011). However, the wisdom in this view has been questioned by many scholars.  
 
While some scholars agree that capital account liberalization may be desirable, they argue that its 
gains are only attainable if the liberalization follows a gradual process. Others have dismissed any 
attributable gain from capital account liberalization on the premise that an unregulated capital flow 
would facilitate the occurrence and spread of currency crisis (Edison et al., 2004; Fernández et al., 
2016). Along this line, Henry (2007) noted that the conventional view about capital account 
liberalization is nothing short of a fanciful attempt to extend the results on the gains to international 
trade in goods to international trade in assets. As argued further by the author, the view about gains 
of capital account liberalization would only hold in a world that is free from all market frictions 
except that which is imposed by barriers to free capital flows, but this is inconsistent with economic 
realities. Reflective of these conflicting arguments, earlier empirical studies devoted to shedding 
light on the relationship are no less ambiguous. For instance, while Quinn (1997) found a 
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statistically significant positive association between capital account liberalization and economic 
growth, Rodrik (1998) and Kraay (1998) do not find any evidence of such. 
 
In light of this weak evidence, several studies have explored how a country’s idiosyncrasies can 
shape the effects of capital account liberalization. For instance, studies have examined how a 
country’s financial market (Kose et al., 2011), institutional quality (Bekaert et al., 2005; Chinn & 
Ito, 2006; Kose et al., 2011), overall development level (Klein & Olivei, 2008; Prasad et al., 2007) 
and macroeconomic policies (Arteta et al., 2003) can influence the growth effect of capital account 
liberalization. Studies have also examined the direct effect of capital account liberalization on 
different components of economic growth such as financial development (Klein & Olivei, 2008), 
productivity (Bonfiglioli, 2008), domestic investment (Mody & Murshid, 2005), exchange rate 
(Edwards & Rigobon, 2009), stock market variability (Edwards, 1999), foreign exchange liquidity 
(Cantú, 2019), and international trade (Tamirisa, 1999; Wei & Zhang, 2007; Fu & Cao, 2020).  
 
On the international trade effects of capital control, copious channels could be divulged about the 
nexus. For instance, capital control can cause a significant disparity between the official exchange 
rate and the market rate thereby imposing an additional trade cost which would dampen trade. 
However, it could also be that capital controls are used to maintain a stable exchange rate, which 
will ultimately spur export growth due to a reduction in exchange rate variability. Also, excessive 
foreign capital inflow can cause appreciations of the real exchange rate, and therefore a loss of 
external competitiveness. In this case, capital controls could be considered a second-best policy 
option to hedge against such risks. 
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Furthermore, capital controls can affect trade by increasing transaction costs. Capital controls stifle 
the development of liquid and efficient foreign exchange markets and modern payment 
instruments, which would increase the cost and uncertainty associated with international 
transactions (Tamirisa, 1999, p.71). Akin to this, Wei & Zhang (2007) argued that one of the 
responses of firms to capital controls is to miss-invoice imports and exports to circumvent capital 
account restrictions. In response to this, custom officers would increase inspection at the border in 
a bid to guard against firms that may try to evade the capital restriction and thereby dampening 
trade. Capital controls can also reduce trade by limiting knowledge and technology transfers 
through foreign direct investment. Multinational enterprises typically prefer to move across the 
border to optimize their operations and then repatriate profits. As stressed by Markussen (1995), 
when a firm invests in a foreign country, it often brings with it its proprietary technology to compete 
successfully with indigenous firms. Domestic firms benefit from these through supply chain 
linkages, labor turnover, and market restructuring. These gains impact on the productive capacity 
and the quality of exported goods of local firms. In the event of capital controls, firms tend to lose 
out from these gains as capital controls deter foreign direct investments. Also, the inability to 
convert local currency to foreign currency can be a barrier for firms that source essential 
intermediate inputs abroad. 
 
Finally, but not least, it could also well be that capital controls affect trade by affecting the supply 
and cost of capital. Chinn & Ito (2006) argued that unfettered cross-border capital flows allow the 
interest rate to rise to its competitive market equilibrium and enable domestic and foreign investors 
to engage in more portfolio diversification, which ultimately reduces the cost of capital and 
increase the availability of capital for borrowers. It also increases the efficiency level of the 
financial system by weeding out inefficient financial institutions. Arguing along this line, Tamirisa 
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(1999 p.71) notes that in the presence of capital controls, financial intermediation margin is often 
high, and local financial institutions enjoy substantial market power, while the range of available 
financial products and services tends to be narrow. Hence, financing trade is either unavailable or 
costly, and trade is more likely to fall.  
 
While we argue that capital control can affect trade through different ways, to tract our empirical 
analysis, we solely focus on the effect of capital control on trade via the cost of capital channel. To 
attain this feat, we build on the theoretical argument and empirical strategy adopted in the literature 
on credit constraint and international trade (e.g., see Amiti & Weinstein, 2011; Manova, 2013). 
This literature argues that while all exporters face huge exporting costs which make them more 
reliant on external finance, differences in firm-specific credit constraints lead to heterogeneous 
export responses at the sector level to macroeconomic changes. Manova (2013), for instance, 
provides theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that financially developed economies 
export relatively more in sectors that require more outside capital. Underpinning her work as well 
as those of others in the literature is the assumption that well-developed financial intermediaries 
and markets reduce moral hazard and adverse selection problems which tend to increase the firm's 
cost of external capital. Similarly, we argue that because unfettered international capital flow 
reduces the cost of capital and increase its availability for the borrowers, the export performances 
of sectors that require more outside capital would be relatively better-off and vice-versa. 
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3. Research Methodology 
3.1. Empirical Strategy 
To test the hypothesis that fettered international capital flows adversely affects the relative export 
performances of industries with greater reliance on external finance, results based on estimating 
variations of the following equation will be presented: 
 𝛷𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜏𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝑗𝑡 + 𝜏𝑠 + 𝜓0𝑲𝑖𝑡 + 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜐𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡       (1) 
 
where 𝛷𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the export flow in industry s from country i to j in period t. 𝜏𝑖𝑡 and 𝜏𝑗𝑡  are time-
varying importer and exporter fixed effects to proxy “multilateral resistance term” and other 
unobserved time-varying country heterogeneities. 𝜏𝑠 is industry fixed effects. 𝑲𝑖𝑡 measures the 
extent of capital control in a country, while 𝜅𝑠 is a measure of an industry's external finance 
dependence. 𝜅𝑠 is country and time-invariant. Hence, we exclude its individual effect from 
equation (1) as it is already subsumed in the industry fixed effects.1 The individual effect of 𝑲𝑖𝑡 is 
also excluded from equation (1) since it will be absorbed by the time-varying exporter fixed effects. 
However, in the baseline result, we shall report results where we use time-invariant exporter and 
importer fixed effects. 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 is a vector of bilateral trade cost variables such as bilateral 
distances (ln 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇), common border (𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟), and Common language (𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝐴𝑁), and Bilateral 
trade agreements (𝐹𝑇𝐴).2 Finally, 𝜐𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the idiosyncratic error term. We estimate equation (1) 
using OLS. However, in the robustness section, we shall consider two additional model 
                                                             
1
 In an unreported result, we perform two additional analyses. First, we remove the industry fixed effects and directly 
control the industry's external finance dependence. Second, we interact with the indicator of an industry external 
finance dependence with time dummies and see if the effect changes over time. In both cases, the results are similar to 
those obtained when we estimate the baseline equation (1).  
2
 Because we include time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects, they absorb conventional time-varying exporter 
and importer controls like GDP pc, GDP and population. 
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specification and estimation strategies. Firstly, we shall implement the Helpman et al. (2008) two-
stage estimation procedure, which corrects for selection bias that may arise due to the omission of 
zero trade flows. Secondly, we shall implement the Santos & Tenreyro (2006) Poisson-Pseudo 
Maximum likelihood (PPML) which corrects for both zero trade flows, and bias and inefficiency 
that may result from estimating a log-linear model in the presence of heteroscedasticity which is 
common in trade data.  
 
Because we are interested in how capital control affects exports by increasing the cost of external 
capital, equation (1) explains bilateral industry export activity by interacting an industry 
characteristic (𝜅𝑠) with a country characteristic (𝐾𝑖𝑡). Therefore, 𝜓0 is the coefficient of interest, 
and we expect it to be negative and statistically significant at all times, suggesting that countries 
with fettered international capital flows have, on average, relatively worse export performance in 
industries with greater reliance on external finance. This empirical strategy builds on Rajan & 
Zingales (1998); they authors interacted a country-level indicator of financial development with an 
industry-level indicator of external finance dependence to identify the causal connection between 
financial development and output-growth. Utilizing this approach offers two gains. First, it 
minimizes concern over endogeneity. Specifically, it reduces concern over reverse causality 
because, while it is clear that capital control at the country-level would affect industrial activities, 
there is little or no reason to believe that export activities of specific industries should affect the 
extent of capital control at the country-level. It also reduces concerns over omitted variable bias 
because the specification allows the inclusion of different types of fixed effects. Secondly, it 
focuses on a specific channel, in our case the cost of external capital, through which the examined 
variables are related.  
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3.2. Data 
Our primary empirical measure of capital control is the aggregate de jure capital control measure 
developed by Fernández et al.  (2016). The index measures the intensity of a country’s restrictions 
on the cross-border capital inflow and outflow for 100 countries over the period 1995 to 2015. Each 
component of the index is based on ten different asset categories: money market instruments (with 
a maturity of 1 year or less), bonds (with maturity higher than one year), equities, collective 
investments, derivatives, real estate, financial credits, commercial credits, guarantees and sureties, 
and direct investment. Each of the subcomponents is a binary variable that is set equal to one when 
there is a restriction and zero otherwise. The aggregate capital control intensity is then the average 
of the two resulting indicators on capital inflow and outflow. A higher value indicates a higher 
intensity level on capital control. In our sample, the values range from a low value of 0 to a high 
value of 1. The mean value is 0.34 with a standard deviation of 0.34. Countries at the 75th percentile 
have a score value of 0.68 while those at the 25th percentile have a score value of 0.05. Although 
we are interested in the aggregate capital control indicator, in the extended analysis, we shall also 
explore the differential trade effects of the two subcomponents of the aggregate capital control 
indicator i.e. inward and outward capital control.  
 
As a robustness check, we shall employ two additional indicators on capital control. Firstly, we use 
the updated data of Chinn & Ito (2002) indicator on capital account openness. The index is based 
on principal component analysis of five proxies for government restrictions on capital mobility, 
including the openness of the capital account, the openness of the current account, requirements 
for the repatriation and surrender of export proceeds, and the existence of multiple exchange rates. 
Each of the subcomponents is a binary variable that is set equal to one when restrictions are non-
existent and zero otherwise. Hence, higher values indicate capital liberalization. We reverse the 
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index by multiplying it by -1 so that higher values would signify higher controls on capital. As an 
attempt to capture the de facto capital control, we utilize the Lane & Milesi-Ferretti’s (2007) 
measure of external capital stock as a share of GDP (following Kose et al. (2011) and Eichengreen 
et al. (2011)).3 Because higher values of the variable indicate higher capital account liberalization, 
we also multiply it by -1 so that higher values can be interpreted as more restrictions on capital 
control.  
 
The data on exports come from the BACI-CEPII database at the 6-digit Harmonized System 
Classification (HSC) for which there are corresponding explanatory variables over the sample 
period. We then use a concordance table to map the 6-digit HSC products into the 3-digit category 
in the ISIC Revision 2 Industry Classification.4 Because we are interested in how capital control 
affects exports and the channels through which these effects come about, we derive six outcomes 
variables from the resulting trade data: (i) total export (𝑇𝑠𝑖𝑗) in industry s country i exports to 
country j; (ii) number of 6-digit HSC products (𝑁𝑠𝑖𝑗) in industry s country i exports to country j; 
(iii) number of markets destinations (𝑀𝑠𝑖) in industry s country i export to; (iv) average export per 
product (?̅?𝑠𝑖𝑗) in industry s country i exports to country j; and (v) export intensity (𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗) in industry 
s country i exports to country j. Following recent developments in the literature (Manova, 2013; 
Manova, 2015; Ndubuisi & Foster, 2019; Dutt et al., 2013; etc.), we define (ii)-(iii) as the extensive 
export margin, while (iv)-(v) are defined as the intensive export margin. 
 
                                                             
3
 As argued by Kose et al. (2011), the variable is a summary measure of a country’s total exposure to international 
markets. Hence, it captures the extent of a country’s financial integration which should be increasing the lower the 
capital control in the country. 
4
 https://wits.worldbank.org/product_concordance.html 
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𝑇𝑠𝑖𝑗 is calculated as the sum of HSC product value in industry s from country i to j. 𝑁𝑠𝑖𝑗 and 𝑀𝑠𝑖 
are calculated as a simple count of the number of products and market destinations in industry s, 
respectively. The average export per product (?̅?𝑠𝑖𝑗) and export intensities (𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗) in industry s by 
country i to j are calculated using the following equations: 
 
                                    ?̅?𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 𝑇𝑠𝑖𝑗 𝑁𝑠𝑖𝑗⁄                                 … (2) 
                                        𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 𝑉𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑉𝑖𝑡 𝑉𝑠𝑤𝑗𝑡𝑉𝑤𝑡⁄                                    … (3) 
 
where 𝑉𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the volume of export in industry s by country i to j in period t, 𝑉𝑖𝑡  is the total export 
volume of country i to the world. 𝑉𝑠𝑤𝑗𝑡  is the volume of export in industry s by a reference country 
(all country in the sample) to country j in period t, while 𝑉𝑤𝑡 is the total volume of export by the 
reference country. Other variables are as defined above. Table A1 in the appendix shows the 
distribution of the outcome variables in our sample. 
 
For the industry measure of external finance dependence, we use the external finance dependence 
index that was initially computed by Rajan & Zingale (1998). It is computed as the average share 
of capital expenditures not financed with cash flows from operations. The computation is done 
using the Compustat annual industrial data on all publicly‐listed firms in the US. While using the 
US as a benchmark to compute the index is due to the lack of comparable cross-country cross-
industry data, our empirical framework treats the external finance dependence as a technological 
component of the industry. That is, it is for technological reasons that, say, the textile industry 
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depends more on external finance to fund its activities than the food products and beverages 
industry. In this situation, what matters is only the ranking of industries along these technological 
characteristics and as the financial market of US is well‐developed, using the US as the benchmark 
ensures that the realized indicators are more reflective of firms' optimal choice over external 
financing in each sector (Rajan & Zingales, 1998; Manova, 2013, Crino & Ogliari, 2017). An added 
advantage of this approach is that it ensures the industry characteristic is not endogenous to the 
macroeconomic dynamics of a country, such as changes in the extent of capital control in the 
country.  
 
To isolate the differential effect of capital control on exports in external finance dependent 
industries, in the robustness section, we shall control for different industry characteristics such as 
skill, capital, natural resource, institutional and R&D intensities, and asset intangibility, liquidity 
need, and industrial goods durability. These variables are taken from Kroszner et al. (2007), Nunn 
(2007) and Manova (2013). Table A2 in the appendix describes how they are measured. To ensure 
that the indicator of capital control is not picking the effects of other country characteristics, in the 
robustness section, we shall also control for the differential export effects of other country 
characteristics in external finance dependent industries. The country characteristics include human 
capital, physical capital, natural resource, institutional quality, domestic credit market, consumer 
price index, trade openness, and per capita GDP. Table A3 in the appendix describes these variables 
and their sources. 
 
Finally, all gravity model variables are also taken from the BACI-CEPII database. Except for 
Distance, which is measured in kilometers per distance, the other bilateral trade costs variables are 
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dummies that take the value of one if the country-pairs are common in those dimensions and zero 
otherwise.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
This section proceeds in four sub-sections. The first section presents the baseline results. The 
second section presents the robustness checks on the former. The third section presents the results 
on the export margins, while the last section presents the results on the export effects of capital 
control when we differentiate between inward and outward capital control, and the results on the 
export effects of capital control in OECD and non-OECD countries. 
 
<Insert table 1 here> 
 
4.1. Baseline Results 
Table 1 displays the baseline results about the effect of capital control on exports using the 
Fernández et al. (2016) aggregate measure of capital control. The dependent variable for each 
reported regression in the table is (log) disaggregated total bilateral industry exports while the 
standard errors are all clustered at the country-pair level. Before exploring the differential effect of 
capital control on exports, we first conduct a preliminary analysis by estimating the average effect 
of capital control on exports in columns (1)-(3). Specifically, we regress log bilateral industry 
exports on our measure of capital control without controlling for the interaction term between 
capital control and external finance dependence. Column (1) shows the result when we only include 
the control variables in the benchmark equation (1). The result suggests that capital control has a 
significant adverse effect on exports. However, when we include additional control variables in 
column (2) to minimize omitted variable bias, the estimated coefficient of capital control turns 
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statistically insignificant, albeit it is still negative. In column (3), we replace the exporter and 
importer fixed effects with country-pair fixed effects to control for unobserved country-pair 
heterogeneities. The estimated coefficient of capital control turns back to being statistically 
significant at 1 percent. Overall, results in columns (1)-(3) are somewhat consistent with those 
obtained by Tamirisa (1999) and Wei & Zhang (2007) in suggesting that capital controls hurt trade 
 
Next, we turn to our primary empirical investigation and focus on the interaction between capital 
control and external finance dependence which are reported in columns (4)-(8). Columns (4)-(6) 
re-estimate the regressions of columns (1)-(3) while including the interaction variable between 
capital control and external finance dependence. In the three columns, the estimated coefficient of 
the interaction variable is consistently negative and statistically significant at all conventional 
levels. This is suggestive evidence of a strong sectoral heterogeneous effect of capital control that 
is driven by an industry's relative dependence on external finance in meeting up the enormous costs 
associated with exporting. Column (7) shows results when we estimate our benchmark equation 
(1) which uses industry and time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects. The estimated 
coefficient of the interaction variable is consistent with its previous estimates in columns (4)-(6). 
In column (8), we further replace the industry fixed effects with time-varying industry fixed effects 
to control for potential influences of time-varying industry factors on trade. Again, we find that our 
initial result remains unchanged.  
 
Overall, the results presented in columns (4)-(8) of Table 1 support our hypothesis that capital 
control adversely affects export performances of sectors that tend to depend more on external 
finance, which we argue is because of the higher cost of external capital associated with fettered 
international capital flows. The result is also economically meaningful. For instance, based on the 
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estimated coefficient of 𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡 in column (7), the result suggests that a one standard deviation 
expansion in the capital control measure will reduce total exports by 12.2 percentage points for an 
industry at the average external finance dependence. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient of 𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡 in column (7) indicates that total exports for an industry with an average external finance 
dependence (0.28) reduce by 23.2% in a country with capital control at the 75th percentile (0.68) 
compared to a country with capital control at the 25th percentile (0.05).  
 
Finally, regarding the control variables, across each specified model in the Table, we obtain 
estimated coefficients with their a-priori expected signs where statistically significant.  
 
4.2. Baseline Result: Additional Robustness Checks 
In this section, we subject the baseline result on the differential export effects of capital control to 
several robustness checks including; (i) controlling for other industry and country characteristics 
that may confound the effect of capital control on exports; (ii) controlling for alternative industry 
financial vulnerability; (iii) using alternative measures of capital control; and (iv) controlling for 
zero trade observation. In all cases, we find that our initial result that capital control adversely 
affects export performances of sectors that depend more on external finance is preserved. 
 
4.2.1. Confounding Factors 
While our main results indicate that capital control adversely affects exports in industries with high 
dependence on external finance, this result would be biased if our variable of interest (𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡) is 
correlated with the error term. This can occur if the extent of capital control is correlated with other 
country characteristics, which could be a source of comparative (dis-)advantage in industries that 
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depend more on external finance. The estimated coefficient of 𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡 would also be biased if the 
industry external finance dependence is correlated with other industry characteristics which have 
been found to also affect the composition of trade in the broader trade literature. There can also be 
some mixture of these two effects, for example, that high capital control is correlated with poor 
institutional quality, and that a large number of institutionally-dependent industry exports is 
correlated with having high external financing needs. To address these concerns, we perform two 
additional analyses. Firstly, we control for other country characteristics interacted with their 
respective industry characteristics. We report the results for this exercise in Table 2. Secondly, we 
rerun our basic equation (1) with full sets of interaction terms between industry external finance 
dependence and country characteristics. We report the results for this exercise in Table 3.  
 
<Insert table 2 here> 
 
In Table 2 where we include interaction term variables between different country characteristics 
and their respective industry characteristics, we observe that the estimated coefficient of 𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡  remains consistently negative and statistically significant at all conventional levels. 
Importantly, introducing these interaction term variables individually in columns (1)-(4) and jointly 
in column (5) only marginally affect the sizes of the estimated coefficient of 𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡, but the main 
evidence of a differential effect of capital control on exports is preserved. These results lead to the 
further conclusion that the observed differential export effects of capital control due to differences 
in industries’ reliance on external finance are independent of these other sources of comparative 
advantages. In column (5), we further control for the level of a country's domestic credit market 
and find that our initial result is still preserved even after jointly accounting for other interaction 
terms between different industry characteristics and their respective country characteristics in 
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column (6). One of the ways that have been emphasized in the literature through which capital 
control affects industrial activities in the economy is through its effect on the domestic credit 
market (Chinn & Ito, 2006; Kose et al., 2011; Eichengreen et al., 2011). Hence, the observed 
significant effect of capital control in columns (5) and (6), even after controlling for the influence 
of the domestic credit market, suggests that capital control exerts on influence on exports over and 
above its effect on the domestic credit market.  
 
The newly added interaction variables also yield results that are consistent with the existing 
literature. For instance, in column (7), the estimated coefficients of the interaction variables 
between physical and human capital and their respective factor intensities are consistent with those 
obtained by Nunn (2007) and Levchenko (2007). They suggest that skill-intensive countries export 
more in skill-intensive industries, while capital-intensive countries export more in capital-intensive 
industries. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term between institutional quality and 
contract intensity is consistent with Nunn (2007), and it suggests that countries with better 
contracting institutions export more in contract-intensive industries. The estimated coefficient of 
the interaction term between financial development and external finance dependence is consistent 
with Manova (2013) and it suggests that financially developed economies export more in 
financially vulnerable industries. Lastly, the result of natural resources suggests that resource-rich 
countries have a comparative advantage in resource-intensive industries (see Levchenko, 2007). 
 
<Insert table 3 here> 
 
Next, columns (1)-(6) of Table 3 report the results when we rerun the basic specification with full 
sets of interaction term variables between external finance dependence and different country 
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characteristics to ensure that the observed differential effect of capital control on export is not 
picking the effect of other country characteristics that may be a source of comparative (dis-
)advantage in external finance dependent industries. In column (7), we further interact (log) 
exporter per capita GDP with industry external finance dependence to isolate any effect due to the 
overall development of the country that capital controls may be picking. In all cases, we find that 
our initial result remains unchanged even when we jointly include these interaction variables in 
column (8). These results, therefore, suggest that fettered international capital flows exert an 
independent influence in external finance dependent industries, an effect we argue is by increasing 
the cost of external capital.  
 
4.2.2. Alternative Financial Vulnerability  
Our identification strategy on the causal connection between capital control and patterns of exports 
has relied on the cost of external capital, which we argue is higher in a country with a fettered 
international capital flows. But that due to inter-industry differences on the relative dependence on 
the financial market to assuage their financial needs, the effect of capital control on industrial 
activities in a country would vary across industries. Is this true or just an artifact of the data? We 
probe more into this in Table 4 by controlling for other industry characteristics that may be related 
to the ease of obtaining external finance which has been employed in the literature.  
 
<Insert table 4 here> 
 
One of the potential sources of an industry financial vulnerability is its R&D intensity. R&D is a 
cost-intensive activity, and it often requires external financing because R&D investing firms 
quickly exhaust their internal funds. However, R&D intensive firms face higher external finance 
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constraints for at least two reasons. First, a significant fraction of R&D expenditures go into the 
salaries and wages of scientists and researchers, which cannot be adequately collateralized by 
financial intermediaries. Second, firms may be unwilling to divulge all information concerning 
their R&D activities to potential lenders as doing otherwise increases the risk that ideas developed 
through R&D activities may be appropriated and replicated by competitors (Agénor et al., 2014). 
If external finance dependence is correlated with the industry R&D intensity, and the country's 
relative export performances are explained by its R&D intensity, it could be that 𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡 is picking 
up variations in the R&D intensity of the goods produced by the industry rather than its dependence 
on external finance. To check for this, in column (1), we include an interaction comprising capital 
control and industry R&D intensity. Despite the high correlation between the indicator of external 
finance dependence and R&D intensity in the sample, which is about 64 percent, we find that our 
initial result is preserved. 
 
While credit arrangement is backed by collateral because lenders must recover their losses by 
exploiting the value of the hypothecated asset in the event of default, intangible assets are 
conventionally considered poor collaterals due to their intangibility and concerns about outside 
valuation, and redeployment (Alimov, 2019). Other things equal, it follows that firms with 
relatively large intangible assets in their balance sheets would face limited credit access and 
ultimately, export less compared to firms with more tangible assets, which can easily be 
hypothecated. While this makes an industry to be more financially vulnerable than others, the 
driving force is more of asymmetric information than the cost of external capital. Notwithstanding, 
it is still possible that capital control exerts an influence on industrial activities through this channel 
since it can stifle the efficiency level of the financial system and deter financial reforms that lead 
to better financial infrastructure to value intangible assets. To isolate this channel from the one we 
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focus on, we interact the industry asset intangibility and capital control in column (2). While we 
find that industries that tend to have a higher proportion of intangible assets are adversely affected 
in a country with fettered international capital flows, the interaction variable between external 
finance dependence and capital control is virtually unchanged from the estimates in column (7) of 
Table 1. 
 
In column (3), we further interact capital control with the ratio of inventories to sales to proxy 
firms’ dependence on external financing for short-term working capital. While this may be a source 
of industry financial vulnerability, firms may overcome this by building superior inventory 
management practices for reasons unconnected to finance (Manova, 2015). Hence, the differential 
effect of capital control on these sectors is ambiguous. Notwithstanding, controlling for this 
variable leaves our main result unchanged. Kroszner et al. (2007) have argued that industries that 
manufacture durable goods tend to be highly dependent on external finance. Hence it could be that 
our interaction term is picking up variations in the durability of goods produced by industry rather 
than its dependence on external finance. To isolate this effect, we interact capital control and 
industry indicator of manufactured goods durability in column (4) and find that our initial result on 
the variable of interest remains unchanged. Finally, we jointly include these new interaction 
variables in column (5), and we find that our results are preserved. Overall, results presented in 
Table 4 support our hypothesis of a differential export effect of capital control that works via 
increasing the cost of external capital. 
 
<Insert table 5 here> 
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4.2.3. Alternative Measures of Capital Control 
In this section, we test the robustness of our results by employing alternative capital control 
measures. Specifically, we use the Chinn & Ito (2002) capital account openness index, and Lane 
& Milesi-Ferretti’s (2007) measure of external capital stock as a share of GDP. As noted in section 
3.2, because higher values of these variables indicate higher capital account liberalization, we 
reverse them by multiplying them by -1 so that higher values would signify higher control on 
capital. Table 5 reports the results when we use these alternative indicators. In all columns in the 
table, the results are consistent with those obtained while using the Fernández et al. (2016) capital 
control measure. In comparison, however, the estimated coefficient of 𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡  when we use the 
Chinn & Ito (2002) index ranks highest, while those obtained using the de facto measure rank 
lowest. Overall, the results presented in Table 5 support our hypothesis. They also suggest that the 
observed adverse effect of capital control on exports in industries with higher dependence on 
external finance is not explained by the capital control measure we utilize.  
 
4.2.4. Dealing with Zero Trade 
Zero bilateral trade flows are commonly observed in bilateral trade data. In our case, it accounts 
for approximately 45 percent of the dyad trade links. Acknowledging the pervasiveness of zero 
trade observations, Helpman et al. (2008) argue that zero trade flows are not random because they 
are conditioned upon various factors such as distance and trade costs. Hence, our baseline result, 
which considers only positive trade flows may be spurious due to sample selection issues. To 
address this problem, Helpman et al. proposed a two-stage estimation procedure to account for the 
biases associated with selection and the omission of the extensive margin due to ignoring zero trade 
flows. However, Santos & Tenreyro (2006) argue that heteroscedasticity is pervasive in trade data 
and a log-linear specification that uses OLS or other estimators that require non-linear 
   
25 
Second Draft: November, 2019 
transformations are unable to address the bias and inefficiency that may result thereof properly. 
Hence, they proposed the Poisson-Pseudo Maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator which can be 
applied to unlogged trade data. Because the trade data are in levels, the method also allows 
accounting for zero trade flows. We implement these two methods and report the results in Table 
6. 
<Insert table 6 here> 
 
The first-stage equation of the Helpman et al. two-stage estimation procedure is a Probit selection 
equation with the dependent variable taking a value of one for positive exporter-industry-importer 
pairs and zero otherwise, while the second-stage is a trade flow equation. The dependent variable 
in the latter is the log bilateral industry export value by destination. The implementation of the 
procedure requires the use of an empirical proxy for the fixed costs of international trade, which 
affects firm export status but not the level of their exports. Following Helpman et al. (2008) and 
Manova (2013), we consider two sets of excluded instruments associated with regulation costs of 
firm entry: number of days to register a business (cost1) and the relative cost to GDP per capita for 
an entrepreneur to start operating a business (cost2).5 Using these variables as exclusion 
instruments are informed by the fact that countries with regulatory barriers to starting a domestic 
business are more likely to face barriers to export.  
 
As a result, in column (1) of Table 6 confirms, higher regulatory costs of doing business reduce the 
probability of export market participation. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient of 𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡   is 
negative and statistically significant at all conventional levels. This suggests that capital control 
                                                             
5
 Data on these variables are taking from the World Bank Development Indicators. 
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lowers the probability of entering new markets, and this effect is higher in industries with greater 
external finance dependence. This provides the first empirical evidence of a potential differential 
effect of capital control on the extensive export margin. The second-stage result is illustrated in 
column (2). We find that our main result still holds even after correcting for biases due to selection 
and the omission of the extensive margin. The estimated coefficient of 𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡 is still significant 
with the expected sign and is quantitatively close to those obtained from the benchmark regression.  
Finally, column (3) reports the result for the PPML. We find that the estimated coefficient of 𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡 
is still significant with the expected sign. Overall, results reported in Table 6 lend credence to the 
hypothesis that fettered international capital flows adversely affect export performance in 
industries with greater reliance on external finance. 
 
4.3. Export Margins 
Results in the previous sections suggest that capital control adversely affects the patterns of a trade 
by increasing the cost of external capital. In this section, we probe further on the potential 
mechanisms underlining this nexus by analyzing the effects of capital control on the extensive and 
intensive export margins. As indicated in section 3.2, the extensive margin is defined here as the 
number of 6-digit HSC product in industry s country i exports to country j, and the number of 
market destinations in industry s country i export to. These two margins capture the idea of product 
and market diversification. On the other hand, the intensive margin is defined here as the average 
exports per product and the intensity of exports in industry s country i exports to country j. We 
argue that fettered international capital flows, by raising the cost of external capital, would 
negatively affect aggregate exports by reducing the extensive and intensive export margins.  
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Drawing insights from the heterogeneous firm trade models (e.g., see Melitz, 2003, Bernard et al., 
2003, Chaney, 2008; Manova, 2013) where changes in fixed and variable trade costs affect export 
activities, capital control can affect the extensive and intensive margins by increasing the relative 
trade costs firms face. While exporting is well-associated with fixed and variable costs, which make 
exporters more reliant on external finance, capital control makes it difficult for firms to meet up 
with these costs. On the one hand, the increase in the cost of external capital induced by capital 
control increases the relative fixed and variable costs a firm from the country with stringent capital 
controls would face. Hence, firms from such a country will find it relatively more challenging to 
enter the export markets while already exporting firms will find it relatively more challenging to 
break into new markets or meet up its export demand, and these would drive down the extensive 
export margin.6 It will also affect the range of goods exported, as new firm entry is often associated 
with new or differentiated products because they want to gain market niche.  
 
Ideally, exporters would like to export to multiple markets as much as they would like to diversify 
their product scope. Among others, export market diversification reduces export earnings 
instability and insulates an exporter from market-specific shocks. However, multiple market entry, 
as opposed to single market entry, is associated with additional entry costs that exporters must 
account for. Because capital control increases the cost of external capital, exporters are unable to 
pay for these additional costs associated with multiple market entry, and thereby, reducing the 
number of market entry. On the other hand, because of the relative increase in variable trade costs 
induced by capital control, firms would be unable to ship more products per market destination. 
Alternatively, they may reduce their export intensities, as they face more constraints in overcoming 
                                                             
6
 Capital controls that restrain exchange rate convertibility would also intensify this effect.  
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the trade variable costs. The concomitant effects of these two would then drive down the intensive 
export margins. Moreover, the exit of firms because of limited capital access to intensify production 
could also contribute to exerting a negative effect on the intensive margins. Indeed, Eichengreen 
et al. (2011) have shown that capital control lowers industrial outputs. 
 
<Insert table 7 here> 
 
Against this backdrop, Table 7 reports the results on the effect of capital control on the extensive 
and intensive export margins. We report the results using the three capital control measures to show 
the robustness of our results. Columns (1)-(3) show the results for the number of products exported, 
while columns (4)-(6) show the results on the number of markets exported to in the industry. The 
number of observations in columns (4)-(6) falls markedly to about 56,000 because we collapse the 
importer dimension of the data. Consistent with our expectation, the estimated coefficient of 𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡 
in columns (1)-(6) are consistently negative and statistically significant at all conventional levels, 
suggesting that capital control disproportionately affects aggregate exports by reducing both the 
range of exported goods and the number of market entry. These results corroborate the first-stage 
result of the Helpman et al. (2008) two-stage estimation procedure reported in Table 6, which 
showed that capital control reduces the probability of market entry, particularly for credit-
constrained industries. Finally, columns (7)-(12) report the results for the intensive margin with 
columns (7)-(9) showing results for the average export per product, while column (10)-(12) show 
results for the export intensity. Consistent with our conjecture, we find a negative and statistically 
significant effect of the variable of interest on both margins. In summary, results reported in Table 
7 support our argument that capital controls, by raising the cost of external capital, would 
negatively affect aggregate exports by reducing the extensive and intensive export margins.  
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4.4. Further analysis 
The analysis so far has focused on aggregate measures of capital controls. It has also focused only 
on the full sample. However, there are reasons to believe that capital control may exert a 
heterogeneous effect on trade, which may come from different restrictions on inward or outward 
capital control or the development level of a country. For instance, Fu & Cao (2020) found that 
inward capital control hurts exports, while outward capital controls have a positive impact on 
exports. Tamirra (1999), on the other hand, found evidence of an adverse effect of capital control 
on only exports of developing countries. In this section, we investigate these two potential sources 
of heterogeneity.  
 
<Insert table 8 about here> 
 
Table 8 reports results on the differential effect of outward and inward capital controls on total 
exports and export margins. For the total exports in column (1), we observe that both inward and 
outward capital controls adversely affect total export. However, the relative impact of inward 
capital control, as measured by the sizes of the estimated coefficients is higher. This is further 
corroborated by the fact that when we subject the estimated coefficients of the interaction variables 
between “inward capital control and external finance dependence”, and “outward capital control 
and external finance dependence” to an F-test, the hypothesis that they are equal is rejected at the 
1 percent significant level. The test also leads to the conclusion that both types of control exert an 
independent adverse effect on the patterns of exports. While this result is different from that of Fu 
& Cao (2020) which uses the same measure of capital control, their study focuses only on the 
average export effects of inward and outward capital controls. Our study, on the other hand, 
establishes causality by exploiting the variation in capital control across countries and the variation 
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in external finance dependence across sectors. The remaining columns in the Table show results 
for the different export margins. The results are largely consistent with those reported in Table 7 
in suggesting that capital control, by raising the cost of external capital, would adversely affect 
total export by reducing the extensive and intensive export margins. Also, the results further 
suggest that this adverse effect of capital control on bilateral exports include both controls on 
inward and outward cross-border capital flows.7  
 
<Insert table 9 about here> 
 
Table 9 displays the results on the effect of capital control on the patterns of trade of countries at a 
different development level. We follow Klein & Olivei (2008) and analyze the effect of capital 
control in OECD and non-OECD countries. Columns (1)-(2) show results on total export for OECD 
and non-OECD countries. While the results suggest that capital control has an adverse trade effect 
in both groups when we compare the relative sizes of the estimated coefficients of 𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡  in both 
groups, we observe that the effect is higher for non-OECD countries. This suggests that the adverse 
effect of capital control on exports in industries with higher reliance on external finance is higher 
for non-OECD countries compared to OECD countries.8 One of the plausible explanations for this 
could be that non-OECD countries are capital-scarce economies wherein capital controls intensify 
the situation. Finally, the remaining columns in the Table show the results for the different export 
margins. The results are largely consistent with those reported in Table 7 in suggesting that capital 
                                                             
7
 Except for the results in column (3), when we subject the estimated coefficients of the interaction variables between 
“inward capital control and external finance dependence”, and “outward capital control and external finance 
dependence” in columns (2)-(5) to an F-test, the hypothesis that they are equal is also rejected at the 1 percent 
significant level in all case. 
8
 In an unreported result, we obtain the same result when we use the other two indicators.  
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control deters export via the extensive and intensive margins. An exception to this is columns (5)-
(6) wherein we do not find any significant effect on the margin. Overall, the result in Table 9 
indicates that capital control adversely affects export in OECD and non-OECD countries, but this 
effect could be worse for non-OECD countries.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Studies on the economic effects of restrictions on cross-border capital flows have paid little 
attention to its effect on international trade. Importantly, few existing studies that have evaluated 
the relationship between capital control and international trade only focused on the average effect 
of capital control on aggregate trade. In this study, we advanced the literature by analyzing how 
capital control affects the patterns of trade by raising the cost of external capital. We also contribute 
to the literature by evaluating how capital control affects the extensive and intensive export margins 
to provide context on the exact mechanism linking capital control and trade. To address our 
research objective that capital control affects trade via the cost of external capital channel, we 
examined the differential impact of capital control on the export activities across industries with 
inherently different reliance on external finance (following the methodology in Rajan & Zingales, 
1998). Our identification assumption is then that because of a relatively greater dependence of 
some industries on external finance to fund their activities, including trade, the higher cost of 
external capital induced by capital control would apply more forcefully to these industries, given 
the inefficiency in the credit market. 
 
Results from the analysis support our hypothesis that capital control adversely affects exports by 
increasing the cost of external capital. We also find that the export distorting effects of capital 
control is invariant of whether the restriction is on inward or outward cross-border capital flows, 
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although the relative impact of inward capital control is higher. When we examine the effect of 
capital control on export margins, we find that capital control affects aggregate exports by reducing 
the extensive and intensive export margins. Specifically, we find that restrictions on cross-border 
capital flows reduce the range of exported goods and deters both single and multiple market entry 
by exporters (i.e., the extensive margins) and reduces the average export per product and export 
intensities of exporters (i.e., the intensive margin), particularly in industries that are more reliant 
on external finance. Finally, we find that the export distorting effects of capital control is higher in 
non-OECD countries relative to OECD countries. From a policy perspective, our findings suggest 
that for countries that pursue export-led growth, policies on capital control are incompatible with 
this objective. At a more granular level, our findings also suggest that a country’s industry 
composition can shape the effect of capital control in the local economy. Specifically, it suggests 
that countries that export more in external finance dependent industries are affected more adversely 
by restrictions on cross-border capital flows. 
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Table 1: Capital Control and Exports: Baseline Result 
 
(log) Total Exports 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Capital Control -0.134 -0.035 -0.087 0.316 0.412 0.361   
 [0.029]*** [0.027] [0.026]*** [0.033]*** [0.031]*** [0.030]***   
Capital Control ×  Finance  
Dependence (𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡)    -1.338 -1.329 -1.336 -1.325 -1.326 
 
   [0.046]*** [0.046]*** [0.046]*** [0.046]*** [0.047]*** 
Log Bilateral Distance -1.296 -1.289  -1.296 -1.289  -1.289 -1.290 
 [0.020]*** [0.020]***  [0.020]*** [0.020]***  [0.020]*** [0.020]*** 
Border 0.606 0.613  0.603 0.610  0.607 0.607 
 [0.080]*** [0.080]***  [0.079]*** [0.080]***  [0.080]*** [0.080]*** 
Language 0.573 0.576  0.573 0.575  0.577 0.577 
 [0.037]*** [0.037]***  [0.037]*** [0.037]***  [0.037]*** [0.037]*** 
FTA 0.452 0.477 0.171 0.453 0.479 0.171 0.493 0.494 
 [0.032]*** [0.032]*** [0.015]*** [0.032]*** [0.032]*** [0.015]*** [0.035]*** [0.035]*** 
Colony 0.735 0.738  0.734 0.737  0.739 0.739 
 [0.077]*** [0.077]***  [0.076]*** [0.077]***  [0.077]*** [0.077]*** 
log Exporter GDP 0.271 0.218  0.276 0.222   
  [0.061]*** [0.061]***  [0.061]*** [0.061]***   
Log Importer GDP 0.501 0.529  0.499 0.526   
  [0.043]*** [0.042]***  [0.043]*** [0.042]***   
Log Exporter GDP pc 0.001 0.054  -0.003 0.050   
  [0.065] [0.065]  [0.065] [0.065]   
Log Importer GDP pc 0.138 0.134  0.141 0.138   
  [0.046]*** [0.046]***  [0.046]*** [0.046]***   
Log Exporter Population 0.005 0.005  0.005 0.005   
  [0.000]*** [0.000]***  [0.000]*** [0.000]***   
Log Importer Population 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002   
  [0.000]*** [0.000]***  [0.000]*** [0.000]***   
         
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Exporter Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No 
Importer Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Country-Pair Effects No No Yes No No Yes No No 
Exporter-Year Effects No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Importer-Year Effects No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Industry-Year Effects No No No No No No No Yes 
R-Squared 0.60 0.60 0.65 0.60 0.60 0.65 0.61 0.61 
# Observations 3,044,044 3,033,098 3,033,035 3,044,044 3,033,098 3,033,035 3,033,098 3,033,098 
             * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in squared brackets.  
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Table 2: Capital Control and Export: Conventional Sources of Comparative Advantage  
  
(log) Total Exports 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Capital Control × Finance Dependence (𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡) -1.222 -1.325 -1.222 -0.922 -0.679 -0.738 -0.290 
 [0.046]*** [0.046]*** [0.045]*** [0.044]*** [0.042]*** [0.044]*** [0.043]*** 
Human Capital × Skill Intensity 1.336    1.639  1.619 
 [0.042]***   [0.040]*** [0.041]*** 
Physical Capital × Capital Intensity -0.000   0.013  0.014 
  [0.005]   [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Natural Resource × Resource Intensity  0.055  0.052  0.052 
   [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Institutional Quality × Contract Intensity    1.019 1.036  0.892 
    [0.026]*** [0.025]*** [0.025]*** 
Financial Development × Finance Dependence     0.850 0.662 
      [0.019]*** [0.018]*** 
        
Exporter-Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Importer-Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.62 
# Observations 2,963,858 3,033,098 3,033,098 3,033,098 2,963,858 2,793,257 2,731,510 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in squared brackets. Each column in the table contains unreported estimated 
coefficients on log bilateral distance, Border, Colony, Common Language, and FTA, as in column (7) of Table 1. 
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Table 3: Capital Control and Exports: Confounding Factors 
  
(log) Total Exports  
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Capital Control × Finance Dependence (𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡) -0.442 -1.402 -1.123 -0.145 -0.907 -1.245 -0.216 -0.137 
 [0.050]*** [0.041]*** [0.045]*** [0.047]*** [0.048]*** [0.046]*** [0.049]*** [0.046]*** 
Human Capital × Skill Intensity 1.346       1.641 
 [0.042]***      [0.040]*** 
Human Capital ×  Finance Dependence 1.094       0.151 
 [0.026]***      [0.038]*** 
Physical Capital × Capital Intensity 0.040      0.045 
  [0.005]***     [0.005]*** 
Physical Capital ×  Finance Dependence 0.394      0.279 
  [0.009]***     [0.009]*** 
Natural Resource × Resource Intensity  0.048     0.050 
   [0.002]***    [0.002]*** 
Natural Resource ×  Finance Dependence  -0.028     -0.008 
   [0.002]***    [0.002]*** 
Institutional Quality × Contract Intensity    0.776    0.810 
    [0.025]***   [0.024]*** 
Institutional Quality ×  Finance Dependence   0.613    0.320 
    [0.014]***   [0.028]*** 
Average Tariff ×  Finance Dependence    -0.052   -0.007 
     [0.002]***  [0.002]*** 
Consumer Price Index × Finance Dependence     0.011  0.005 
      [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Log GDP pc ×  Finance Dependence      0.493 -0.005 
       [0.011]*** [0.023] 
Exporter-Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Importer-Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.63 
# Observations 2,963,858 3,033,098 3,033,098 3,033,098 2,972,363 2,918,066 3,033,098 2,853,877 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in squared brackets. Each column in the table contains unreported estimated 
coefficients on log bilateral distance, Border, Colony, Common Language, and FTA, as in column (7) of Table 1. 
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Table 4: Capital Control and Exports: Alternative Sources of Financial Vulnerability 
  
(log) Total Exports  
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Capital Control × Finance Dependence (𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡) -1.224 -1.186 -1.334 -1.298 -0.816 
 [0.044]*** [0.046]*** [0.046]*** [0.044]*** [0.047]*** 
Capital Control × R&D Intensity -2.547    -6.577 
 [0.574]***    [0.559]*** 
Capital Control × Asset Intangibility  -3.028   -3.592 
  [0.120]***   [0.125]*** 
Capital Control × Liquidity Ratio   2.289  3.935 
   [0.345]***  [0.377]*** 
Capital Control × Durable Goods    -0.094 -0.335 
    [0.024]*** [0.026]*** 
      
Exporter-Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Importer-Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 
# Observations 3,033,098 3,033,098 3,033,098 3,033,098 3,033,098 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in squared brackets. Each column 
in the table contains unreported estimated coefficients on log bilateral distance, Border, Colony, Common 
Language, and FTA, as in column (7) of Table 1. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Capital Control and Exports: Alternative Measures of Capital Control 
  
(log) Total Exports   
  Chin & Ito (2002) Index  Lane & Milesi-Ferretti’s (2007) Index 
  [1]   [1] 
Capital Control × Finance  -1.432  -0.044 
Dependence (𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡) [0.042]*** [0.003]*** 
    
Exporter-Year Effect Yes  Yes 
Importer-Year Effect Yes  Yes 
Industry Yes  Yes 
R-Squared 0.61   0.61 
# Observations 3,015,640   3,033,098 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in squared brackets. Each column 
in the table contains unreported estimated coefficients on log bilateral distance, Border, Colony, Common 
Language, and FTA, as in column (7) of Table 1. 
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Table 6:  Capital Control and Exports: Zero Trade Flows 
  
Helpman et al. (2008) 2-Stage Procedure   Santos & Tenreyro (2006) 
 
 Pr(Total Exports > 0) 
 
 (log) Total Exports  
 
 Total Exports  
  [1]   [2]   [3] 
Capital Control 0.096 
    
 [0.019]*** 
    
Capital Control × Finance 
Dependence (𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡) -0.224  -1.109  -0.305 
 [0.019]***  [0.042]***  [0.181]* 
Cost1 -0.141     
 [0.021]***     
Cost2 -0.412     
 [0.158]***     
      
Exporter Effect Yes  No  No 
Importer Effect Yes  No  No 
Exporter-Year Effect No  Yes  Yes 
Importer-Year Effect No  Yes  Yes 
Industry Effect Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared  -   0.63    - 
# Observations 5,458,752   3,033,098   5,458,752 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in squared brackets. Each column 
in the table contains unreported estimated coefficients on log bilateral distance, Border, Colony, Common 
Language, and FTA, as in column (7) of Table 1. Also, column (1) contains unreported importer and exporter per 
capita GDP.  
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Table 7: Capital Control and Export Margins 
  (log) # Products   (log) # Markets   (log) Export Per Product   (log) Export Intensity 
 Extensive Margins  Intensive Margins 
  [1] [2] [3]   [4] [5] [6]   [7] [8] [9]   [10] [11] [12] 
Capital Control × Finance  -0.560 -0.605 -0.016  -7.810 -15.390 -0.525  -0.765 -0.827 -0.028  -1.335 -1.591 -0.047 
Dependence (𝑘𝑠𝑲𝑖𝑡) [0.019]*** [0.017]*** [0.001]*** [2.988]*** [2.6502]*** [0.128]***  [0.031]*** [0.029]*** [0.002]*** [0.055]*** [0.051]*** [0.003]*** 
 
               
Exporter-Year Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Importer-Year Effects Yes Yes Yes  No No No  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.72 0.72 0.72    0.91  0.91  0.91   0.44 0.44 0.44   0.71 0.71 0.71 
# Observation 3,033,098 3,015,640 3,033,098    55,852  54,963 55,852   3,033,098 3,015,640 3,033,098   3,012,217 2,995,495 3,012,217 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in squared brackets. Except for columns (4)-(6), each column in the table 
contains unreported estimated coefficients on log bilateral distance, Border, Colony, Common Language, and FTA, as in column (7) of Table 1. 
Note: Columns (1), (4), (7), and (10) are estimated with the Fernández et al. (2016) capital control measure which is our primary capital control measure. 
Columns (2), (5), (8) and (11) are estimated with the Chinn & Ito (2002) capital control indicator, while columns (3), (6), (9) and 12 are estimated with the Lane 
& Milesi-Ferretti (2006) indicator on gross external capital stock.
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Table 8: Inward and Outward Capital Controls and Exports 
  
(log) Total 
Export   
(log) # 
Products   
(log) # 
Markets   
(log) Export Per 
Product   
(log) Export 
Intensities 
   Extensive Margin  Intensive Margin 
  [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5] 
Inward Capital Control × 
Finance Dependence -0.913  -0.393  -8.438  -0.520  -1.051 
 [0.079]*** [0.032]*** [4.634]*  [0.055]*** [0.098]*** 
Outward Capital Control × 
Finance Dependence -0.206  -0.106  -0.127  -0.099  -0.171 
 [0.065]*** [0.026]*** [4.014]  [0.045]**  [0.080]** 
 
         
Industry Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Exporter-Year Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Importer-Year Effects Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
R2 0.61   0.72   0.91   0.44   0.71 
N 3,032,283   3,032,283   55,800   3,032,283   3,011,449 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in squared brackets. Except for 
column (3), each column in the table contains unreported estimated coefficients on log bilateral distance, Border, 
Colony, Common Language, and FTA, as in column (7) of Table 1. 
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Table 9 Capital Control and Exports: OECD and Non-OECD Countries 
  (log) Total Export   (log) # Products   (log) # Markets   (log) Export Per Product   (log) Export Intensities 
    Extensive Margin  Intensive Margin 
 [OECD] [non-OECD]  [OECD] 
[non-
OECD]     [OECD] [non-OECD]  [OECD] [non-OECD] 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6]   [7] [8]   [9] [10] 
Capital Control ×  -1.173 -1.325  -0.379 -0.560  0.188 0.056  -0.795 -0.765  -0.942 -1.335 
Finance Dependence [0.076]*** [0.046]*** [0.029]*** [0.019]*** [0.121] [0.070]  [0.056]*** [0.031]*** [0.089]*** [0.055]*** 
               
Industry Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Exporter-Year Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Importer-Year Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.70 0.61   0.79 0.72   0.82 0.85   0.54 0.44   0.79 0.71 
# Observation 1,180,736 3,033,098   1,180,736 3,033,098   14,596 41,256   1,180,736 3,033,098   1,177,446 3,012,217 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in squared brackets. Except for (5)-(6), each column in the table contains 
unreported estimated coefficients on log bilateral distance, Border, Colony, Common Language, and FTA, as in column (7) of Table 1. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Description: Export Variable 
 Variable #Observation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Level 
Total Export  5,501,034 31467.14 478382.8 0 1.44e+08 
Total Export > 0 3,044,044 56865.73 641966.9 1 1.44e+08 
# Products 3,044,044 30.95521 58.71501 1 661 
Export Per product 3,044,044 1262.469 19488.05 1 7513925 
Export Intensity 3,044,044 4.43e-06 0.0006128 0 0.3758505 
# Markets 55,852 82.78386 58.57295 0 216 
      
Log 
Total Export > 0 3,044,044 6.464311 3.260093 0 18.78615 
# Products 3,044,044 2.228285 1.581986 0 6.493754 
Export Per product 3,044,044 4.236026 2.14263 0 15.83227 
Export Intensity 3,022,904 -21.93587 5.032954 -43.92455   -0.9795637 
 # Markets 55,852 4.030856 1.041138 0 5.375278 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Industry Characteristics 
Contract intensity (z1) measures for each industry, the proportion of its intermediate inputs that are not traded on organized 
exchange while contract intensity (Taken from Nunn (2007)). External finance dependence (EFD) is the median of the share of 
capital expenditures not financed with cash flows from operations.  (taken from Manova (2013)). Physical capital intensity (PCI) 
is defined as the share of real capital stock to total value added in 1980 (taken from Ciccone & Papaioannou, 2009). Liquidity needs 
(LN) is the ratio of inventories to sales. Durable goods (DG) is an indicator that takes a value of one of the sector manufactures 
predominantly durable goods, and a value of zero if the sector manufactures predominantly nondurable goods. Intangibility (AI) is 
the median level of the ratio of intangible assets to fixed assets. R&D intensity is the median level of the ratio of R&D expenses 
over sales for ISIC industries for the period. Data on LN, DG, IA, and R&D come from Kroszner et al. (2007), while data on NS 
come from Manova (2013). 
ISIC Industry Description z1 LN R&D IA EFD PCI HKI NSI DG 
311 Food products 0.331 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.14 1.366 0.812 0 0 
313 Beverages 0.713 0.10 0.00 0.14 0.08 1.744 1.135 0 0 
314 Tobacco 0.317 0.28 0.00 0.34 -0.45 0.730 1.354 0 0 
321 Textiles 0.376 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.19 1.807 0.688 0 0 
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 0.745 0.21 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.481 0.502 0 0 
323 Leather products 0.571 0.23 0.01 0.09 -0.14 0.663 0.687 0 0 
331 Wood products, except furniture 0.516 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.28 1.632 0.741 1 1 
332 Furniture, except metal 0.568 0.15 0.01 0.09 0.24 0.789 0.698 0 1 
341 Paper and products 0.348 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.17 2.215 1.139 1 0 
342 Printing and publishing 0.713 0.07 0.01 0.43 0.20 0.785 0.934 0 0 
352 Other chemicals 0.490 0.15 0.02 0.20 0.75 0.800 1.209 0 0 
353 Petroleum refineries 0.058 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.04 2.593 1.656 1 0 
354 Misc. petroleum and coal products 0.395 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.33 1.199 1.153 1 0 
355 Rubber products 0.407 0.15 0.02 0.06 0.23 2.265 0.985 0 0 
356 Plastic products 0.408 0.13 0.02 0.18 1.14 1.416 0.827 0 0 
361 Pottery, china, earthenware 0.329 0.17 0.02 0.00 -0.15 2.316 0.804 0 1 
362 Glass and products 0.557 0.15 0.02 0.06 0.53 1.954 1.012 0 1 
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.377 0.15 0.01 0.03 0.06 1.746 0.952 1 1 
371 Iron and steel 0.242 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.09 3.194 1.251 1 1 
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372 Non-ferrous metals 0.160 0.16 0.01 0.05 0.01 2.013 1.098 1 1 
381 Fabricated metal products 0.435 0.17 0.01 0.09 0.24 1.173 0.914 0 1 
382 Machinery, except electrical 0.764 0.20 0.02 0.13 0.60 1.017 1.119 0 1 
383 Machinery, electric 0.740 0.18 0.07 0.03 0.95 0.924 1.064 0 1 
384 Transport equipment 0.859 0.18 0.02 0.11 0.36 1.320 1.322 0 1 
385 Professional and scientific equipment 0.785 0.21 0.09 0.15 0.96 0.654 1.234 0 1 
390 Other manufactured products 0.547 0.20 0.02 0.15 0.47 0.878 0.755 0 1 
3511 Industrial chemicals 0.246 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.25 2.385 1.408 0 0 
P(25)  0.331 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.800 0.804 0.00 0.00 
P(75) 
Mean  
0.713 
0 .481 
0.18 
0.16 
0.02 
0.02 
0.14 
0.10 
0.47 
0.28 
2.014 
1.484 
1.209 
1.017 
1.00 
0.25 
1.00 
0.48 
 
 
 
Table A3: Additional Control Variables 
Variable Name Definition Source 
Natural Resources Total natural resources rents (% of 
GDP) 
WDI 
Per capita GDP  Per Capita GDP  WDI 
GDP GDP  WDI 
Population Total Population WDI 
Consumer Price Index Consumer price index (2010 = 100) WDI 
Average Tariff Tariff rate, applied, simple mean, all 
products (%) 
WDI 
Financial Development Domestic credit to the private sector 
by banks (% of GDP) 
WDI 
Institutional Quality Rule of Law World Governance Indicator 
Physical Capital Capital Stock Penn World Table 9.0 
Human Capital Human Capital Index Penn World Table 9.0 
 
